Yeah, problems of individuation are ubiquitous. And, as you say, there’s no privileged set. Philosophers are loath to admit this because they think it’ll destroy philosophy. But it’s actually the first step to enlightenment. You just have to ask the right questions. Like: why are we so interested in analysis — in reducing larger individuations (e.g. ideas and concepts) to smaller individuations? And why is there always a gap — a counterexample — such that the parts don’t quite add up to the whole?
Really appreciated this — especially the idea that metaphysical systems often just define their own terms and spin inwards. What I keep coming back to, though, is whether metaphysics gains meaning only when it becomes lived — when it shapes how we act, relate, and build.
Maybe the test of a metaphysic isn’t internal coherence, but whether it can become praxis. Or maybe that’s all metaphysics ever really is: a story we make real through how we live it.
Could you point me to where you have this diagram of different definitions of "arbitrary"? Stanrock.net doesn't seem to have a search bar, and on a quick google site search I wasn't able to find it.
I appreciate the thrust of this article, plenty of metaphysics does seem to bottom out to convoluted verbal disputes, but I'm not sure how we can say all of it is language disputes. Compatibilism vs Incompatiblism, Moral Naturalism vs Moral Anti-Realism, and Mereological Universalism vs Merelogical Nihilism are debates that I can't see any fact of the matter disagreement beyond how we want to use terms, but I also can't see how, say, a libertarian substance dualist and a determinist reductive materialist could be talking past each other and disagreeing solely on word choice and linguistic understanding.
It’d be an overshoot to say that every metaphysical dispute is verbal. Mark Balaguer shows this (successfully, I think) in his book “Metaphysics, Sophistry and Illusion.” A moral anti-realist can either grant or shelf the robust realist’s semantic thesis to target their ontological thesis. However, one can contest the intelligibility of robust concepts. I follow Lance Bush in suspecting that many if not all robust metaphysical concepts are gobbledygook. It might be a pyrrhic victory, then, to get me to say that there are non-verbal metaphysical disputes.
Yeah, problems of individuation are ubiquitous. And, as you say, there’s no privileged set. Philosophers are loath to admit this because they think it’ll destroy philosophy. But it’s actually the first step to enlightenment. You just have to ask the right questions. Like: why are we so interested in analysis — in reducing larger individuations (e.g. ideas and concepts) to smaller individuations? And why is there always a gap — a counterexample — such that the parts don’t quite add up to the whole?
What do you use for your diagrams?
Mostly just Google Slides.
Really, wow thats cool
I'll share an example so you can see the underpinnings.
Really appreciated this — especially the idea that metaphysical systems often just define their own terms and spin inwards. What I keep coming back to, though, is whether metaphysics gains meaning only when it becomes lived — when it shapes how we act, relate, and build.
Maybe the test of a metaphysic isn’t internal coherence, but whether it can become praxis. Or maybe that’s all metaphysics ever really is: a story we make real through how we live it.
Could you point me to where you have this diagram of different definitions of "arbitrary"? Stanrock.net doesn't seem to have a search bar, and on a quick google site search I wasn't able to find it.
Here you go:
https://x.com/StanRockPatton/status/1764710205538087271
If you search my Twitter feed for "polysemy" and "polysemous" you'll find lots of other examples to explore.
Thanks!
I appreciate the thrust of this article, plenty of metaphysics does seem to bottom out to convoluted verbal disputes, but I'm not sure how we can say all of it is language disputes. Compatibilism vs Incompatiblism, Moral Naturalism vs Moral Anti-Realism, and Mereological Universalism vs Merelogical Nihilism are debates that I can't see any fact of the matter disagreement beyond how we want to use terms, but I also can't see how, say, a libertarian substance dualist and a determinist reductive materialist could be talking past each other and disagreeing solely on word choice and linguistic understanding.
It’d be an overshoot to say that every metaphysical dispute is verbal. Mark Balaguer shows this (successfully, I think) in his book “Metaphysics, Sophistry and Illusion.” A moral anti-realist can either grant or shelf the robust realist’s semantic thesis to target their ontological thesis. However, one can contest the intelligibility of robust concepts. I follow Lance Bush in suspecting that many if not all robust metaphysical concepts are gobbledygook. It might be a pyrrhic victory, then, to get me to say that there are non-verbal metaphysical disputes.
Excellent
Metaphysics is all of the most universally important "What is the nature of" questions, and here's most of the answers: https://kaiserbasileus.substack.com/p/metaphysics-in-a-nutshell
https://substack.com/profile/180492741-stan-patton/note/c-73185766?r=2zgl39
Does language communicate anything?
I think so!